

The Civilizational Risks of a UAP Technology Arms Race:

Nonhuman Technology and Global Security

Marik von Rennenkampff

The Policy Papers of the Sol Foundation
Volume 2, No. 3. Summer 2026.

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

Contents

Executive Summary 4

1. An Arms Race Fueled by Nonhuman Technology? 5

2. Nonhuman Technology and a Vulnerable World 8

3. Nuclear Weapons and the Failure of International Control 10

4. Global Security and Nonhuman Technology 20

5. Towards an Advanced Technology Development Authority..... 22

Conclusion 25

About the Author 28

Notes 29

Bibliography 35

Executive Summary

Key members of the United States Senate and former executive branch officials indicate that the United States and competitor nations are engaged in a surreptitious arms race to exploit advanced technologies of nonhuman origin. A geopolitical competition of this nature, should it indeed exist, poses grave risks to global security. A common assumption that official acknowledgment of the existence of advanced nonhuman intelligence or technology leads invariably to global cooperation and harmony among adversarial states is by no means guaranteed. Instead, any such public disclosure may intensify currently-hidden weaponization efforts, catalyzing a uniquely destabilizing—and potentially catastrophic—global security dynamic.

Nuclear and conventional deterrence, the pillars of international security, rely on predictable, well-understood capabilities. The deployment of revolutionary weapons systems derived from nonhuman technology would almost certainly render existing military and defense structures obsolete and upend current deterrence models. A state that masters military applications of nonhuman technology before its competitors, for example, may be incentivized to employ this advantage before rival nations achieve strategic parity. This is especially the case if a state weaponizes such technology to achieve a perceived "safe first strike" advantage by neutralizing an adversary's capacity to mount a nuclear retaliatory strike. Similarly, growing secrecy and strategic paranoia spurred by an unconstrained arms race to weaponize nonhuman technology—compounded by the increasingly advanced, technologically discontinuous weaponry and delivery methods that it yields—may lead to catastrophic miscalculations and misunderstandings. The destabilizing civilizational risks inherent in any geopolitical competition to exploit nonhuman technology, the full range of potential applications of which remains unknown, demand historically unprecedented nonproliferation efforts.

A dearth of public discourse and attention to the existential dangers of a nonhuman technology-fueled armaments race poses an additional grave risk to global security. Drawing on philosopher Nick Bostrom's "vulnerable world" hypothesis and the failure of post-World War II U.S. efforts to bring nuclear weapons and energy under international control, this paper argues that any race to weaponize such technology must be viewed through a human civilizational—versus a national—security lens.

Three potential scenarios for the evolution of global security following public acknowledgment of nonhuman technology are presented: **(1)** A default "catastrophic arms race," **(2)** "open scientific exchange," and **(3)** "closed scientific exchange." This paper argues that a "catastrophic arms race" to exploit nonhuman technology poses an unacceptable existential risk to humanity and cannot be "won." On the other hand, a "closed scientific exchange" model would see all recovered nonhuman technology transferred to an international scientific research organization tasked with the development and operation of peaceful innovations and technologies. Such an entity (e.g., an Advanced Technology Development Authority) would be modeled on the Atomic Development Authority proposed in 1946 by physicist Robert Oppenheimer to establish international control over nuclear energy. Beyond research and development, the Authority would engage in inspection and verification activities to deter state cheating or non-

compliance. While the establishment of such an entity would undoubtedly face significant obstacles, an international initiative to jointly research and develop nonhuman technology represents the most viable—and perhaps the only—path to global stability, responsible innovation, and human advancement in a postdisclosure world.

1. An Arms Race Fueled by Nonhuman Technology?

In recent years, numerous former executive branch officials, including at least one individual now under statutory whistleblower protections, alleged that the United States and its geopolitical competitors retrieved and are attempting to exploit advanced technologies of nonhuman origin. Key members of the United States Senate echoed these allegations via legislation and in public commentary. In 2023, then-Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and co-sponsors Michael Rounds, Marco Rubio, Kirsten Gillibrand, Todd Young, and Martin Heinrich introduced the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) Disclosure Act.[1] Beyond establishing a nine-member panel to review and recommend government UAP records for declassification, the Disclosure Act defines the terms "nonhuman intelligence" and "legacy program." The latter is defined as government and related "endeavors to collect, exploit, or reverse engineer technologies of unknown origin or examine biological evidence of living or deceased nonhuman intelligence."[2]

Acknowledging a core allegation that elements of the executive branch transferred retrieved UAP materials to private defense contractors to evade congressional oversight and transparency laws, the Disclosure Act states that "[t]he Federal Government shall exercise eminent domain over any and all recovered technologies of unknown origin and biological evidence of nonhuman intelligence that may be controlled by private persons or entities in the interests of the public good."[3] Additionally, the legislation makes oblique reference to the surreptitious arms race to exploit nonhuman technology alleged by former executive branch officials, stating that "comprehensive open scientific and technological research and development [of retrieved UAP materials is] essential to avoiding or mitigating potential technological surprise in furtherance of urgent national security concerns."[4]

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, drafted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, expands on this section of the Schumer-led UAP Disclosure Act.[5] Like the Disclosure Act, the Intelligence Authorization Act also suggests that excessive secrecy stunted innovation and technical advances derived from retrieved UAP technology. According to the committee, "due to the increasing potential for technology surprise from foreign adversaries and to ensure sufficient integration across the United States industrial base and avoid technology and security stovepipes:

1. the United States industrial base must retain its global lead in critical advanced technologies; and
2. the Federal Government must expand awareness about any historical exotic [UAP] technology antecedents previously provided by the Federal Government [to private de-

fense firms] for research and development purposes."[6]

While Congress ultimately failed to enact the preceding sections of the UAP Disclosure Act and the 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act into law, key members of the Senate added context in public commentary. Serving as vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, current Secretary of State and acting national security advisor Marco Rubio stated, "If [U.S. adversaries'] approach to [UAP] is driven by science and a desire to match what they think is ours, we'll wake up one day and realize 'I don't know how they got there, but they got there ahead of us, and now we're screwed.'"[7] Similarly, in a 2023 interview where he characterized "firsthand" whistleblowers[8] alleging the existence of surreptitious UAP retrieval and reverse-engineering efforts as "smart, educated people with high clearances and very important positions in our government," Rubio stated, "My biggest fear is that some adversary has made a technological leap—that would be really bad news—and that we have been caught flat-footed on it."[9]

Similarly, Senator Michael Rounds, a member of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services committees, stated, "If [Chinese leader] Xi Jinping had access to this [UAP technology], if [Russian president Vladimir] Putin had access to this, and they thought that we did not have access to similar capabilities than what they did, do you think for a second that they wouldn't consider using it to achieve their ends of domination?"[10] Rounds, notably, also stated that, "If the capabilities that exist come to the forefront, and they become known to the world, it might very well be that it is to the benefit of mankind."[11] Rounds expanded on these apparent "capabilities" in a 2025 interview. Whistleblowers who allegedly work directly on alleged UAP reverse-engineering programs, according to Rounds, describe the retrieved or reverse-engineered technology as "phenomenal in terms of its capabilities, in terms of speed, some of these objects—the speed at which it moves—the easy way in which it can change directions, the fact that it can be… both underwater and in the air[12] and it can, apparently, move to very, very high altitudes… in a very short period of time."[13] Rounds, like Rubio, vouched for the "firsthand"[14] whistleblowers who have spoken to the Senate Intelligence Committee, stating, "They are not making this stuff up… There's no reason for them to come in and to try to tell us stories. These are folks that are very, very capable. They are brilliant individuals."[15]

Congressional concern over technological advances by U.S. adversaries derived from retrieved UAP technology dates back nearly two decades. In 2008, then-Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, at the urging of former astronaut and senator John Glenn, joined the late senators Ted Stevens and Daniel Inouye to sponsor[16] the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program (AAWSAP) to investigate "potential breakthrough technology applications employed in future aerospace weapon systems."[17] The program's stated objective involved investigating "*foreign* advanced aerospace weapon threats from the present out to the next 40 years."[18] According to Department of Defense documents, AAWSAP focused, in particular, on "the potential threat posed by unconventional or 'leap' aerospace vehicles that could pose national security implications for the United States."[19]

In an apparent reference to potential "breakthrough" advancements by foreign adversaries based on recovered UAP technology, the AAWSAP contract solicitation states, "The focus is *not* on extrapolations of current aerospace technology," but on "discontinuities in currently evolving technology trends."[20] Additional documentation states that the Reid-funded AAWSAP intend-

ed to investigate the "[f]uture threat… from potential terrestrial adversaries who might make breakthroughs in the development of game-changing disruptive technologies based on evaluation of [UAP] phenomena via sensor data and C/R (crash/retrieved) materials."[21]

Reid also conveyed concerns regarding potential strategic breakthroughs by U.S. adversaries based on exploited UAP technology publicly. In a 2019 interview with journalist George Knapp, for example, Reid stated, "I'll bet you anything that China is spending some money checking this out; I'll bet you anything [that] KGB Putin is spending some money checking this out."[22] In his prepared statement before a September 9, 2025, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, Knapp, who maintained a close, decades-long relationship with Reid, stated, "Senator Reid firmly believed that the U.S., Russia, and China had recovered advanced unknown technology and were in a race to reverse engineer the technology. The first one to do so would control everything."[23] In a 2025 interview, Dr. James Lacatski, the director and program manager of the Reid-sponsored AAWSAP, answered "Yes, absolutely," when asked whether the United States is engaged in an arms race to exploit retrieved UAP technology.[24] Jay Stratton, a former senior intelligence official who had a prominent role in AAWSAP and ultimately led the U.S. government's UAP Task Force,[25] stated, "The first country that cracks the code on this [retrieved UAP] technology will be the leader for years to come. This is similar to the Manhattan Project. We developed the atomic weapon—we won the war—and it made us a superpower for almost a century now. This is the atomic weapon on steroids."[26]

In 2023, U.S. Air Force veteran and former intelligence official David Grusch testified under oath to the existence of "multi-decade" UAP crash retrieval and reverse-engineering efforts before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.[27] Prior to his public testimony, the inspector general of the Intelligence Community deemed Grusch's allegation that elements of the executive branch improperly withheld information on UAP-related activities from Congress "credible and urgent," triggering mandatory notifications to the congressional intelligence committees.[28, 29] Notably, I. Charles McCullough, formerly the first inspector general of the Intelligence Community, a Senate-confirmed position, submitted Grusch's formal complaint to the office that he once led. McCullough also sat immediately behind Grusch during his congressional testimony, adding notable weight to the underlying allegations.

In a 2023 interview, Grusch alleged that the United States is engaged in a "publicly unknown Cold War for recovered and exploited physical [UAP] material."[30] This dynamic, according to Grusch, amounts to "a competition with near-peer adversaries… to identify UAP crashes [and] landings and retrieve the material for exploitation [and] reverse engineering to garner asymmetric national defense advantages."[31] Retired U.S. Army colonel Karl Nell, who served on the UAP Task Force and in key private sector defense and technology positions, including as deputy chief technology officer at defense contractor Northrop Grumman, stated that Grusch's "assertion concerning the existence of a terrestrial arms race occurring sub-rosa over the past 80 years focused on reverse engineering technologies of unknown origin is fundamentally correct."[32] In a July 31, 2026, memorandum to leadership of the 18 agencies and units comprising the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Trump administration indicated that non-disclosure agreements governing UAP programs or activities would be waived, freeing any executive branch or contractor personnel with relevant knowledge to speak to investigators.[33]

2. Nonhuman Technology and a Vulnerable World

In the "vulnerable world" hypothesis, philosopher Nick Bostrom theorizes that some future, as-yet unknown technological advance will invariably destabilize or destroy human civilization unless historically unprecedented surveillance and global cooperation measures are implemented.[34] Bostrom employs a metaphor in which all human ideas, discoveries, and technological advancements are represented by white, gray, and black balls in an urn. Throughout human history, only white balls—"beneficial" developments—and a modest number of gray balls—"moderately harmful" "mixed blessings," such as nuclear fission—have emerged from the "urn of [human] invention."[35] Fortunately, a black ball, a technological advance which destroys civilization "by default," has yet to emerge from the urn of human creativity.

As an example of a potential "black ball" technological development, Bostrom posits that advances in bioengineering may one day permit individuals with only basic training in biology to develop a novel pathogen that kills millions or billions. Any scientific development that democratizes technology so that an individual or a small group can cause destruction on a civilizational level, Bostrom argues, may require a "system of ubiquitous worldwide surveillance."[36] In other words, if a new technology can pose an existential risk to humanity with minimal scientific or technical effort, only extreme "preventative policing"—primarily intrusive mass surveillance—would deter or prevent a sufficiently motivated group or individual from weaponizing that technology.

Bostrom also investigates how technological advances by nations can destabilize global security or destroy humanity. In the "black ball" scenario of a "safe first strike," for example, the development of novel military technologies could incentivize states to strike competitors with little fear of nuclear retaliation. Consider, for example, that a nation develops a technology rendering its adversaries' nuclear-armed intercontinental missiles obsolete. The perceived advantage of striking a competitor incapable of launching an effective retaliatory response incentivizes such a potentially catastrophic safe first strike. According to Bostrom, effective interstate cooperation on security matters, or "global governance" (e.g., banning all nations from developing a destabilizing new technology), may be necessary to avoid catastrophic outcomes from a new scientific advance.

Bostrom also considers a scenario whereby the default outcome of a new technological discovery destroys civilization inadvertently. Prior to the 1945 detonation of the first atomic bomb, for example, physicist Edward Teller theorized that the explosion might ignite the atmosphere, destroying the world. Similarly, in 1954, physicists miscalculated the yield of an early thermonuclear weapon, resulting in a much larger blast than expected. While, thankfully, neither incident resulted in civilizational destruction, humanity may not be so fortunate if a "black ball" technology is discovered in the future.

An arms race among the world's superpowers to exploit advanced nonhuman technologies, should such a dynamic indeed exist, is fertile ground for a destabilizing "black ball" advance.[37] Imagine, for example, that the technologies described by Senator Rounds—craft capable of extreme speeds, extraordinary maneuverability, and the ability to operate in the air or underwater—exist today or may be developed in the near future. In one scenario, a state may adapt such capabilities to develop an operational national missile defense system. By rendering adversaries' nuclear missiles obsolete, the state may perceive a safe first strike advantage against its competitors. In another example, advanced, nonhuman-derived technology is married with existing weapons of mass destruction. Under this scenario, a state may be incentivized to employ such asymmetric technology to rapidly and simultaneously transport hundreds of nuclear warheads directly to an adversary's core political, defense, and nuclear second-strike infrastructure to conduct an ostensibly safe first strike. Alternatively, reverse-engineered UAP technology might be exploited to render strategic nuclear missiles inoperative merely by deploying them in their proximity, as reportedly occurred at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, in 1966 and at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, in 1967.[38] Ultimately, any safe first strike scenario enabled by nonhuman technology could have profound, and potentially catastrophic, impacts on global security and stability.

Importantly, unlike nuclear weapons, the full range of applications and adaptations of alleged nonhuman technology is unknown. Yet more destabilizing innovations, such as a device capable of disabling or destroying an adversary's strategic nuclear missiles, energy infrastructure, or core political institutions from thousands of miles away, may ultimately be developed with minimal effort. Similarly, the secrecy, unpredictability, and strategic paranoia spurred by an arms race to weaponize nonhuman technology—compounded by the increasingly advanced, strategically discontinuous weaponry and delivery methods it yields—may lead to catastrophic miscalculations and misunderstandings.[39] If, for example, a state is unable to verify how close a rival nation is to a major engineering or strategic breakthrough, its leadership may conclude that a potentially catastrophic preemptive strike is necessary for survival.

At the same time, the diffusion and democratization of scientific advances gleaned from nonhuman craft may place profoundly dangerous technologies in the hands of rogue states, groups, or individuals motivated to inflict mass harm. In short, the ostensibly high odds that a "black ball" discovery, innovation, or development emerges from an arms race to exploit advanced nonhuman technology demand unprecedented mitigation measures. Bostrom's remedies to prevent *civilizational* catastrophe—"preventive policing" and "global governance"—must feature prominently in any analysis of a postdisclosure global security paradigm.

3. Nuclear Weapons and the Failure of International Control

The mid-20th century development of nuclear weapons and the ensuing atomic arms race are the closest historical parallels to any potential geopolitical competition to weaponize nonhuman technology. To be sure, any such analogy is imperfect. Not long after World War II, policymakers, scientists, and military leaders generally understood the tactical and strategic implications of nuclear weapons. The full range of potential military applications of nonhuman technology, on the other hand, is unknown. Moreover, states that developed nuclear weapons all did so along a generally consistent linear scientific arc. By comparison, the exploitation of advanced, nonhuman technology by competing states may proceed along vastly different scientific, tactical, or strategic trajectories. In other words, a potential UAP technology arms race may be far more unpredictable, and pose even greater *civilizational* risks, than the nuclear arms race of the 20th century. Such critical nuances aside, past securitization efforts involving nuclear weapons must feature prominently in analyses of global security following any formal disclosure of the existence of nonhuman technology.

Largely forgotten following decades of Cold War-induced fears of civilizational destruction, United States policy in the immediate post-World War II era called explicitly for the international control of nuclear energy and technology. Knowing that other states would inevitably develop the bomb and that the U.S. nuclear monopoly would last for only a few years, leading physicists, most notably Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Leó Szilárd, advocated vociferously for multilateral control. Remarkably, in 1946, the United States offered to eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile and transfer control of its sweeping nuclear infrastructure to a supranational authority.[40] Disagreements with the Soviet Union rooted in a *national*—versus a *civilizational*—security framing doomed the American proposal, formally presented at the then-newly formed United Nations, for the global governance of nuclear energy. In short, fear of "the Other" overshadowed fear of "the Bomb."[41] Over the ensuing eight decades, humanity escaped nuclear catastrophe only through a combination of semi-effective international cooperation and luck.[42] The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), among several notable arms control agreements, serves as an example of moderately successful international cooperation. In the absence of the 191-state party NPT, several dozen states might have developed nuclear weapons since 1945. Such a global security dynamic would almost certainly have made a devastating nuclear exchange, especially through misunderstandings or accidental miscalculations, far more likely. Ultimately, the lessons of the post-World War II failure to bring nuclear energy under international control are broadly applicable to mitigating the civilizational risks of a potential arms race to exploit advanced nonhuman technology.

Early Discussions on International Control of Nuclear Energy

In August 1943, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed secretly that development of the atomic bomb should proceed solely as a U.S.-UK endeavor.[43] Vannevar Bush, an accomplished engineer and the then-director of the

Office of Scientific Research and Development (making him Roosevelt's primary science advisor and a key figure overseeing the Manhattan Project), and James Conant, a chemist and the then-chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, objected. Since the Soviet Union would inevitably develop nuclear weapons, Bush and Conant reasoned, strict Anglo-American cooperation on the bomb excluding Moscow would ultimately alienate the then-nominally allied Soviets.[44] Bush and Conant's early objections went unheeded, sowing the seeds of distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States on future attempts to bring nuclear weapons and technology under international control.[45]

Alarmed by the knowledge that other nations would inevitably develop the atomic bomb, Niels Bohr, a prominent physicist, urged both Churchill and Roosevelt to pursue international control. In a July 1944 letter to Roosevelt, Bohr wrote that the atomic bomb represented "a weapon of unparalleled power… which will completely change all future conditions of warfare."[46] "Unless," Bohr wrote, "some agreement about the control [of nuclear weapons] can be obtained in due time, any temporary advantage, however great, may be outweighed by a perpetual menace to human society."[47] Bohr's letter outlines, in notable detail, concerns over the devastating consequences of nuclear war and the imperative of extraordinary efforts to control nuclear weapons. According to Bohr, "No kind of customary measures will suffice [to control atomic weapons], and… the terrifying prospect of a future [nuclear arms race] can only be avoided through a universal agreement in true confidence."[48]

Bohr's understanding that nuclear war posed a *civilizational* risk to humanity made him the first to envision multilateral control over the underlying science and technology.[49] In early and mid-1944, Bohr met with both Churchill and Roosevelt to make his case. Churchill, in particular, dismissed Bohr's pleas to consider a regime of international control. In a September 1944 memorandum, Roosevelt and Churchill explicitly rejected Bohr's concept of multilateral control, stating, "The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding [the development of the atomic bomb], with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted."[50] The memorandum closes with an explicit warning about Bohr, with Churchill and Roosevelt ostensibly fearing that Bohr might leak information about nuclear science, particularly to the Soviet Union.

Two weeks after Roosevelt and Churchill formally rejected Bohr's pleas, Bush and Conant wrote a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson urging the United States to pursue a post-war policy of "complete international scientific and technical interchange" on atomic science.[51] Free and open scientific exchange on nuclear technology, Bush and Conant believed, should be "backed up by an international commission acting under an association of nations and having the authority to inspect" research facilities to ensure that atomic weapons were not being built illicitly. The September 30, 1944, Bush-Conant memorandum stands as one of the most articulate and early distillations of the *civilizational* threat posed by an "international [nuclear] armaments race" and the necessity of unprecedented global governance to contain the associated risks to humanity. Echoing Bohr, Bush and Conant dismissed any assumption that the United States would maintain a nuclear monopoly in the post-war era as the "height of folly."[52] The two leading Manhattan Project administrators acknowledged "that there will be great resistance" to the prospect of states voluntarily subjecting sensitive military research and development facilities to intrusive inspections, a key element of their

proposal for international control.[53] However, Bush and Conant wrote, "the hazards to the future of the world are sufficiently great to warrant this attempt."[54]

Further employing the framing of *civilizational*, versus *national*, security,[55] Bush and Conant argued that the global governance of atomic weapons and technology—to which the Soviet Union and the United States would almost certainly be "violently opposed"—would amount to "a great step forward in removing some of the dangers to civilization inherent in this new development."[56] "A situation in which several powerful countries are proceeding in secret to develop" atomic weapons, Bush and Conant continued, would result "in a most dangerous world."[57] After considerable deliberation over plausible options for a post-war global security environment, Bush and Conant concluded, "We have been unable to devise any other plan which holds great possibilities that these new developments can be utilized to promote peace rather than to insure devastating destruction in another war."[58] As debates over international control intensified in the immediate post-war era, physicist Robert Oppenheimer, the "father" of the atomic bomb, would come to echo this sentiment.

Bush and Conant persuaded War Secretary Stimson to raise their proposal for international control with the president. On March 15, 1945, Stimson informed Roosevelt of the importance of developing a plan for post-war management of the atomic bomb prior to its first use.[59] One of two options, Stimson told Roosevelt, was the "international control [of nuclear weapons and technology] based upon freedom of science and of access."[60] The meeting was Stimson's last with Roosevelt before the latter's death on April 12, 1945. Two weeks later, on April 25, 1945, Stimson briefed newly sworn-in President Harry Truman on the Manhattan Project. In a memorandum accompanying his briefing, Stimson echoed Bush and Conant's *civilizational* security framing, describing the bomb as "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city."[61] "The world in its present state of moral advancement, compared with its technical development," Stimson wrote to Truman, "would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words, modern civilization might be completely destroyed."[62]

Echoing Bohr, Bush, and Conant, Stimson told Truman that the U.S. nuclear monopoly would not last and that other nations would invariably develop the bomb. As a remedy, Stimson proposed international governance of atomic weapons and technology, while acknowledging that "[n]o system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace."[63] "The control of this weapon," Stimson continued, "will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never theretofore contemplated."[64] Stimson also highlighted a key moral dynamic. As the first nation to develop nuclear weapons, Stimson wrote, the United States faced an obligation "which we cannot shirk, without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization which it would further."[65] Closing his memorandum and, presumably, his verbal briefing to Truman, Stimson wrote, "if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved."[66]

In early May 1945, Truman established the Interim Committee as an advisory body on nuclear matters, with a focus on the wartime use of atomic weapons against Japan as well as

their postwar control.[67] Chaired by Stimson, the committee consisted of prominent political, scientific, and industrial figures, including Bush, Conant, and soon-to-be Secretary of State James Byrnes. On May 31, 1945, the committee, with physicist Robert Oppenheimer present, discussed the Bush-Conant memorandum, but reached no formal decisions.[68] In a June 16, 1945, memorandum, a scientific panel of advisors to the Interim Committee, which included Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and E.O. Lawrence, recommended that the United States inform the Soviet Union, along with Britain, France, and China, prior to any use of nuclear weapons against Japan.[69]

Similarly, on June 21, 1945, the committee recommended unanimously, and "in the hope of securing effective future control," that Truman inform Soviet leader Joseph Stalin about the bomb at the upcoming Potsdam Conference.[70] A few weeks later, following the conference's final plenary session, Truman told Stalin, in somewhat vague terms, that the United States had developed "a new weapon of unusual destructive force."[71] According to Truman, Stalin was "glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese,'" suggesting that Stalin did not grasp the significance of the bomb prior to its first use.[72]

On July 16, 1945, the United States detonated the first atomic bomb in New Mexico.[73] The bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki followed shortly thereafter.[74] In two public statements, the first of which announced the bomb to the world, Truman framed nuclear weapons in both *national* and *civilizational* security terms[75,76] "The atomic bomb," Truman said simply, "is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world."[77] As a remedy, Truman hinted at international control, stating that the United States, Great Britain, and Canada would not reveal scientific information regarding atomic weapons "until means have been found to control the bomb so as to protect ourselves and the rest of the world from the danger of total destruction."[78] Simultaneously threatening additional nuclear attacks to compel a Japanese surrender while employing civilizational security framing, Truman committed the United States to exploring "possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction."[79] To that end, Truman vowed to make "recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can become a *powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace*."[80]

Post-War Efforts to Establish International Control

The formal end of World War II spurred critical discussions among U.S. policymakers about the geopolitical implications—and risks—of the bomb.[81] In a September 11, 1945, memorandum to Truman, War Secretary Stimson described the developments in nuclear science that enabled the bomb as "too revolutionary and dangerous to fit into the old concepts."[82] Stimson framed global security of the early atomic era, first and foremost, through the lens of U.S.-Soviet relations. According to Stimson, the United States' "approach to the Russians [in the earliest days of the nuclear era] is a question of the most vital importance in the evolution of human progress."[83]

Emphasizing the importance of future global governance of nuclear weapons and technology, Stimson wrote to Truman, "any contemplated action leading to the control of this weapon should be primarily directed *to* Russia."[84] In Stimson's judgment, the Soviet Union "would

be more apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach [regarding cooperation on nuclear matters] made by the United States" instead of "as a part of a general international scheme."[85] Not only did Stimson believe in the importance of direct, immediate engagement with the Soviets on international control, he rejected his own prior proposal "to use our possession of the atomic bomb as a direct lever"[86] to induce liberalizing changes in the Soviet Union. Stimson and Truman had previously discussed using cooperation on nuclear matters as a method of "assuring personal rights of liberty to the individual [Soviet] citizen."[87] Stimson, instead, came to believe that the "process of [liberalizing, democratic] change in Russia is more likely to be expedited by" U.S.-Soviet cooperation on nuclear technology.

Truman embraced Stimson's recommendation to bring nuclear weapons and technology under international control. In an October 3, 1945, letter to Congress, Truman wrote, "atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas."[88] "We can no longer rely," Truman told Congress, "on the slow progress of time to develop a program of control among nations."[89] Adopting Bohr, Bush, Conant, and Stimson's *civilizational*—versus *national*—security framing, Truman wrote, "Never in history has society been confronted with a power so full of potential danger and at the same time so full of promise for the future of man and for the peace of the world...

> We can use the knowledge we have won, not for the devastation of war, but for the future welfare of humanity... Civilization demands that we shall reach at the earliest possible date a satisfactory arrangement for the control of this discovery in order that it may become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world peace instead of an instrument of destruction.[90]

After conveying physicists' urgent warning that other nations would invariably develop nuclear weapons, Truman told Congress, "The hope of civilization lies in international arrangements looking... to the renunciation of the use and development of the atomic bomb, and directing and encouraging the use of atomic energy and all future scientific information toward peaceful and humanitarian ends."[91] While acknowledging that "[t]he difficulties in working out such arrangements are great," Truman stated, "[t]he alternative to overcoming these difficulties... may be a desperate armament race which might well end in disaster."[92] Truman promised to work expeditiously. With the formal establishment of the United Nations still weeks away, Truman vowed to commence immediate discussions with the United Kingdom and Canada "to effect agreement on the conditions under which cooperation might replace rivalry in the field of atomic power."[93]

Notably, the United States' military leadership endorsed Truman's proposal for global governance of nuclear weapons and technology. In an October 23, 1945, memorandum to Truman, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Leahy wrote that the Joint Chiefs "regard it as of great military importance that further steps of a political nature should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly, in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons."[94] Leahy and the Joint Chiefs

recommended that Truman engage in "discussions within the United Nations Organization [on] methods of international control for restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind."[95] "The possibility that other nations may succeed in developing atomic weapons in the not too distant future," Leahy wrote, "suggests that the question of political controls is a matter of immediate importance."[96]

In late October 1945, *The Atlantic Monthly* published Albert Einstein's first substantive commentary on the bomb.[97] According to Einstein, whose 1939 letter to President Roosevelt spurred the Manhattan Project,[98] "The release of atomic energy has not created a new problem. It has merely made more urgent the necessity of solving [the] existing [problem of war]."[99] Einstein proposed a radical solution. To solve the problem of war, Einstein believed, "The secret of the bomb should be committed to a World Government" consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.[100] To Einstein, recent discoveries in nuclear fission constituted a near-term "menace" rather than a "boon."[101] Einstein, notably, admitted his fear of the "tyranny of a World Government."[102] "World Government," however, he continued, "is preferable to the far greater evil of wars, particularly with their intensified destructiveness" in the atomic era.[103] Unsurprisingly, Einstein's radical proposal did not gain traction among U.S. policymakers.[104]

On November 15, 1945, just over a month after President Truman's letter to Congress, Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister William Mackenzie King met in Washington to discuss the future of atomic weapons and international control. The resulting joint declaration is framed in explicitly civilizational terms. The three heads of state "recognize that the application of recent scientific discoveries to the methods and practice of war has placed at the disposal of mankind means of destruction hitherto unknown."[105] "Responsibility... that the new discoveries shall be used for the benefit of mankind," the declaration continues, "rests not on our nations alone, but upon the whole civilized world."[106] Nuclear weapons are explicitly described as "a threat to civilization."[107]

As a remedy to the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons, the "Three-Nation Declaration," drawing on a proposal drafted by Vannevar Bush,[108] called for the establishment of a "commission" under the then-newly established United Nations.[109] The commission, according to Truman, Attlee, and King, should promote the "exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends," provide for "control of atomic energy... for peaceful purposes," make proposals regarding "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons," and establish "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions."[110] The Soviet Union agreed to the establishment of such a commission at a Moscow summit the following month.[111] On January 24, 1946, in its very first resolution, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), tasked with executing the objectives laid out in the Three-Nation Declaration.

Truman instructed the State Department to develop the American proposal for the international control of nuclear energy and weapons. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, as chair of the committee responsible for drafting the plan, asked David Lilienthal, the director of the

Tennessee Valley Authority, to assemble a group of scientific and technical advisors with the requisite scientific knowledge on atomic weapons and technology. Over the course of seven weeks in early 1946, the Acheson-Lilienthal committee developed a blueprint for a system of international control. The resulting Acheson-Lilienthal Report, published in late March 1946, assessed the nature of atomic science and energy, the challenges of geopolitical rivalry, the feasibility of safeguards, the functions and composition of a multilateral organization tasked with international control, and the "transition" to supranational control of nuclear technology and energy.[112] Critically, the committee's 60-page report, written primarily by Robert Oppenheimer, is framed in explicitly *civilizational*—rather than *national*—security terms.

At its core, the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal amounted to a grand bargain. If the world would accept international control over atomic energy, the United States would surrender its "atomic monopoly."[113] To accomplish this, the Oppenheimer-led panel proposed the establishment of an Atomic Development Authority with a sweeping mandate to control all "intrinsically dangerous" nuclear activities.[114] This international body would manage the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from the extraction of raw materials from the earth and the development of fissionable materials to the operation of all nuclear power plants.[115] "Individual nations and their citizens," the report proposed, would be "free to conduct, under license and a minimum of inspection, all non-dangerous, or safe, operations."[116]

As a first step, Oppenheimer and the scientific committee recommended "obtaining cognizance and control over the raw materials situation."[117] "The control of raw materials" such as uranium and thorium, the report concluded, "is an essential prerequisite for all further progress and it is the first job that the [Atomic Development] Authority must undertake."[118] Simultaneously, Oppenheimer and the panel recommended that a nascent Atomic Development Authority establish "laboratories for the study of nuclear physics and the technological problems that it must expect to encounter in its future work."[119] The committee believed that developing "suitable forms of liaison and interchange with private and national institutions working on atomic energy" would be a critical early task of the Atomic Development Authority if it was to succeed.[120]

Oppenheimer and the Acheson-Lilienthal panel were acutely aware of the revolutionary nature of their proposal. At the same time, they believed that no alternative approach could prevent a catastrophic nuclear arms race and, by extension, civilizational destruction. As the committee wrote:

> The program we propose will undoubtedly arouse skepticism when it is first considered. It did among us, but thought and discussion have converted us. *It may seem too idealistic [but it] seems time we endeavor to bring some of our expressed ideals into being. It may seem too radical, too advanced, too much beyond human experience. All these terms apply with peculiar fitness to the atomic bomb.* In considering the plan, as inevitable doubts arise as to its acceptability, one should ask oneself, '*What are the*

alternatives?' We have, and we find no tolerable answer.[121]

Beyond establishing strict control over "intrinsically dangerous" nuclear activities, the panel believed that successful implementation of an Atomic Development Authority may eventually even "establish patterns of cooperation among nations, the extension of which may even contribute to the solution of the problem of war itself."[122] As Oppenheimer stated later, "If the atomic bomb was to have meaning in the contemporary world, it would have to be in showing that not modern man, not navies, not ground forces, but war itself was obsolete."[123] Further, Oppenheimer and the Acheson-Lilienthal committee proposed that, "When the plan is in full operation there will no longer be secrets about atomic energy."[124] "This," according to the committee, "is the firmest basis of security; for in the long term there can be no international control and no international cooperation which does not presuppose an international community of knowledge."[125] Summarizing the revolutionary nature of the proposal, Oppenheimer wrote in June 1946 that the Acheson-Lilienthal plan "proposes that in the field of atomic energy there be set up a world government. That in this field there be renunciation of national sovereignty. That in this field there be no legal veto. That in this field there be international law."[126] Ultimately, as Oppenheimer and the committee aptly noted, "If we are to do anything constructive in relation to atomic energy it must inevitably be novel and immensely difficult."[127]

Two days after the March 16, 1946, submission of the Acheson-Lilienthal report, Truman appointed financier and statesman Bernard Baruch as the U.S. representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission.[128] Baruch modified the Oppenheimer-led Acheson-Lilienthal proposal for multilateral control of nuclear energy in several key ways.[129] First, the "Baruch Plan" insisted on "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" for state noncompliance. Second, Baruch's proposal explicitly eliminated the veto, a core element of the United Nations Security Council framework.[130] Removal of the veto would mean that no permanent member of the Security Council could block punishment for any nuclear violations. Third, the Baruch Plan was more ambiguous on whether the Atomic Development Authority should directly control the mining processes that extract fissionable material from the earth. Baruch also placed far more emphasis on staging, a core element of the nuclear grand bargain whereby the United States would cease production of nuclear weapons and eliminate its stockpile only *after* the establishment of an effective system to control nuclear energy.[131]

Ultimately, Baruch's modifications shifted the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal from a cooperative, trust-based model founded on scientific exchange and the peaceful development of atomic energy to a rigid, enforcement-focused initiative.[132] Baruch formally presented his plan in a June 14, 1946, speech at the opening session of the UN Atomic Energy Commission.[133] He framed his remarks in dramatic civilizational—rather than national—security terms:

My fellow citizens of the world: We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. That is our business. Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave

of fear. Let us not deceive ourselves: We must elect world peace or world destruction.[134]

Five days after Baruch presented the American plan to bring nuclear energy under international control, the Soviet representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Andrei Gromyko, gave Moscow's response.[135] Instead of addressing the Baruch Plan, Gromyko called for an international agreement prohibiting "the production and employment of atomic weapons, the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons and the condemnation of all activities undertaken in violation of this convention."[136] In stark contrast to the American framing of nuclear weapons as revolutionary, uniquely destructive means of warfare, the Soviet proposal characterized the bomb as a weapon of mass destruction, roughly in line with chemical or biological weapons.

In the weeks that followed, the Soviets explicitly rejected the American proposal's elimination of the United Nations Security Council veto on nuclear matters.[137] Baruch insisted on the removal to prevent the council's permanent members—China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—from protecting themselves if they engaged in "intrinsically dangerous" atomic activities. More generally, the Soviet Union objected to the Baruch Plan on the grounds that its proposed inspections regime violated national sovereignty, a pillar of the United Nations charter. To compound matters, the U.S. conducted a series of high-profile nuclear tests in the Pacific two weeks after Baruch presented the American proposal, opening the United States to Soviet charges of hypocrisy and hardening Moscow's negotiating position.[138] For its part, the Soviet Union engaged in a crash effort to develop the bomb while simultaneously proposing an international ban on the development and production of nuclear weapons.[139]

After months of deadlocked negotiations, the United States requested a formal vote on the Baruch Plan. On December 30, 1946, ten nations voted in favor of the American proposal for the international control of nuclear energy, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining. The Soviet abstention, effectively a veto, sealed the Baruch Plan's fate. The only viable proposal to establish international control of nuclear energy had failed. Only through a combination of semi-effective arms control agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and luck[140] has humanity avoided catastrophe amid the eight-decade-long nuclear arms race that ensued.

The Failure of International Control of Nuclear Energy

The U.S. proposal to place atomic energy under international control failed for several key reasons. If a potentially catastrophic arms race to weaponize nonhuman technology is to be averted, the fate of the Baruch Plan offers critical lessons.

1. National—versus civilizational—security prevailed: Deep mistrust between the United States and the Soviet Union overshadowed negotiations over the international control of nuclear energy. The Soviets viewed the American proposal as a bid to retain an American "nuclear monopoly,"[141] an unacceptable security risk to Moscow, while the United States

refused to eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of safeguards.[142] The Soviets also resented exclusion from the joint U.S.-UK development of atomic weapons during World War II[143] and accused the United States of using the bomb for leverage in post-war negotiations, claiming "nuclear blackmail" and "atomic diplomacy."[144] Ultimately, fear and mistrust of "the Other" subsumed fear of "the Bomb."[145]

2. Veto: The U.S. plan called for the elimination of the United Nations Security Council veto on atomic matters so that no permanent member could protect itself, or another nation, if either engaged in "intrinsically dangerous" nuclear activities. The Soviet Union explicitly rejected the elimination of the veto as a violation of the principles of the Security Council.

3. Sovereignty: The Soviets viewed the intrusive inspections regime proposed by the United States—intended to identify secret efforts to develop nuclear weapons with sufficient time to react[146]—as incompatible with state sovereignty,[147] a core element of the United Nations charter. The Soviets, suspicious and paranoid of external powers, also almost certainly perceived the proposed inspections regime as an espionage risk.

4. Staging: The U.S. proposal called for the elimination of its nuclear stockpile only *after* the establishment of an effective system of safeguards and international control. The Soviet counterproposal reversed the order, demanding the elimination of American nuclear weapons *before* the international control of nuclear energy could be considered.

5. Inflexibility: Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union signaled flexibility on key points of contention, such as the status of the UN Security Council veto, an inspections regime, and the order in which core elements of the competing proposals to control nuclear weapons and energy would proceed.[148] In short, neither side signaled a willingness to take the risks that the other required for agreement.[149]

6. Structural issues: The forum of the United Nations, where states must propose, debate, and defend proposals in high-profile, high-stakes public negotiations, placed the Soviet Union on the defensive.[150] Moscow also believed that the United Nations, consisting of predominantly capitalist states, was unfairly arrayed against it, leading to perceived isolation and mistrust.

7. Hypocrisy: Two weeks after Baruch presented the U.S. proposal for the international control of atomic energy before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United States conducted a series of high-profile nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific, opening it to Soviet charges of hypocrisy and hardening Moscow's negotiating position.[151] Similarly, the Soviet Union proposed an international agreement to halt all efforts to develop nuclear weapons while simultaneously engaged in a crash effort to develop such weapons.

8. Ideology: Stalin and Soviet leadership believed that the communist Soviet Union had to develop nuclear weapons to demonstrate technological parity with the capitalist United States.[152]

On June 23, 1946, eleven days after after Baruch proposed his plan for international control of nuclear energy at the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Albert Einstein wrote:

> Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men... We will not change the hearts of other men by mechanisms, but by changing our hearts and speaking bravely. We must be generous in giving to the world the knowledge we have of the forces of nature,

after establishing safeguards against abuse. We must be not merely willing but actively eager to submit ourselves to binding authority necessary for world security. We must realize we cannot simultaneously plan for war and peace. When we are clear in heart and mind—only then shall we find courage to surmount the fear which haunts the world.[153]

4. Global Security and Nonhuman Technology

Formal acknowledgment of the existence of advanced nonhuman technology would have profound implications for global security. Nuclear and conventional deterrence, cornerstones of international security, rely on predictable, well-known capabilities. The deployment of revolutionary, strategically discontinuous weapons systems derived from nonhuman technology would likely render existing military and defense frameworks obsolete and upend current deterrence models. Moreover, a common assumption that public disclosure of the existence of nonhuman technology and intelligence ushers in global cooperation and harmony by default is by no means guaranteed.

Instead, official acknowledgment that multiple states possess advanced nonhuman craft may spur a uniquely destabilizing—and potentially catastrophic—arms race to weaponize the underlying technology. The likelihood of such an outcome increases dramatically if, as key members of the U.S. Senate and former executive branch officials suggest, the United States and competitor nations are currently engaged in a decades-long effort to exploit UAP technology for military purposes. With the veil of secrecy lifted, formal, public disclosure of such technology may cause states to devote significant resources to expand currently hidden research and development efforts. As the 20th century development of nuclear weapons and the contemporary race to master artificial intelligence demonstrate, states will always tend to invest heavily in any capability or technology that may plausibly deliver a formidable economic or strategic advantage over competitors. Ultimately, any arms race to exploit nonhuman technology poses grave risks to global security and, by extension, human civilization.

The failure of the post-World War II American initiative to establish international control over nuclear weapons and energy, in tandem with the "preventive policing" and "global governance" remedies Bostrom proposes in the "vulnerable world" hypothesis, are vital to any analysis of a potential post-disclosure global security paradigm. Three plausible scenarios for the evolution of global security following official confirmation of nonhuman technology are presented: **(1)** A default "catastrophic arms race," **(2)** "open scientific exchange," and **(3)** "closed scientific exchange."

1. Catastrophic Arms Race: In a "default" scenario, where no restraints on the development of advanced nonhuman technology exist, states are incentivized to expend extraordinary resources to weaponize retrieved UAP technology. Such a destabilizing global security dynamic poses extraordinary existential risks. If, for example, one nation adapts nonhuman technology to achieve a perceived "safe first strike" capability, the *civilizational*

threat to humanity increases dramatically. Alternatively, in a potential "use it or lose it" scenario, states may be incentivized to preemptively strike a competitor on the brink of achieving an insurmountable strategic advantage based on exploited nonhuman technology.[154]

Similarly, growing secrecy, uncertainty, and strategic paranoia spurred by an arms race to weaponize such technology—and the increasingly advanced weaponry and delivery methods it yields—may lead to catastrophic miscalculations and misunderstandings. In stark contrast to nuclear weapons, this dynamic is compounded by the potentially revolutionary nature of nonhuman technology and its potential derivatives. Additionally, a separate, but related, scenario can be envisioned: Should multiple nations possess advanced nonhuman technology, states may self-select into blocs, roughly along current geopolitical alliances, to research and exploit UAP technology jointly. From the perspective of civilizational security, such a situation is only marginally preferable to a truly anarchic arms race among states. This paper argues that all "catastrophic arms race" scenarios predicated on the weaponization of advanced nonhuman technology pose unacceptable civilizational risks to humanity and cannot be "won."[155]

2. Open Scientific Exchange: An alternative to the default "catastrophic arms race" scenario would see a multilateral agreement whereby all nations (or entities) in possession of advanced nonhuman technology commit to transferring all relevant items to a supranational research and development initiative (e.g., an Advanced Technology Development Authority).[156] The proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority would be modeled on the tenets of open, pioneering international research and development that Robert Oppenheimer envisioned for the Atomic Development Authority and would be tasked with developing and operating *peaceful* applications of nonhuman technology[157]. The opportunity to conduct fundamental and applied research on nonhuman technology would undoubtedly attract preeminent scientists and engineers. Under this scenario, all scientific findings, developments, and innovations derived by the Advanced Technology Development Authority would be disseminated openly. The Authority would also oversee an inspection and verification regime to deter state cheating or noncompliance (e.g., failing to transfer all nonhuman technology to the Authority, engaging in unauthorized research or weaponization activity, etc.).[158]

While an "open scientific exchange" scenario is preferable to a "catastrophic arms race," the broad dissemination of scientific and technical data gleaned from study of advanced nonhuman technology poses a potentially grave civilizational risk. Advanced nonhuman technology—the full spectrum of potential applications of which is unknown—is a prime candidate for a "black ball" discovery (i.e., a scientific advance or discovery which destroys civilization by default, or which a rogue state, group, or individual can weaponize to catastrophic effect with minimal scientific or technical expertise). In short, the "open scientific exchange" scenario addresses the "global governance" remedy proposed by Bostrom,[159] but not the "preventive policing" intended to deter or prevent malicious actors,[160] such as terrorist groups or sufficiently motivated individuals, from weaponizing a new scientific discovery to devastating effect.

3. Closed Scientific Exchange: The preferred evolution of global security following formal disclosure of the existence of nonhuman technology would see a multilateral agreement whereby all nations (or entities) in possession of advanced nonhuman technology commit to transferring all relevant items to an international research and development initiative (e.g., an Advanced Technology Development Authority) tasked with the research, development, and operation of peaceful applications of nonhuman technology.[161] The initiative, modeled on the research- and development-focused Atomic Development Authority envisioned by Oppenheimer, would be composed of preeminent scientists and engineers in relevant fields.

Given the ostensibly high probability that research and study of such technology leads to a black ball scientific discovery which invariably poses an existential risk to humanity, the Advanced Technology Development Authority's findings and discoveries would generally remain restricted to its scientists, engineers, and administrators.[162] Only discoveries and technological advances that are intrinsically safe (e.g., certain medical therapeutics) would be disseminated broadly beyond the Authority. At the same time, given the potential for "black ball" and "dual-use" discoveries (i.e., those with both "safe" and "dangerous" applications), the scientists and engineers affiliated with the Authority would be subject to surveillance and movement restrictions.[163] Over time, as trust and confidence among participating nations grows, such intrusive "preventive policing" measures may be eased. Like the "open scientific exchange" scenario, the Advanced Technology Development Authority would oversee an inspection and verification regime to deter state cheating or noncompliance.

Importantly, the precise structure and functions of the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority are left open. The framework outlined here, borrowing from the Oppenheimer-led proposal for an Atomic Development Authority, is presented "not as a final plan, but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build."[164]

5. Towards an Advanced Technology Development Authority

In 1946, a U.S. proposal to avert a potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race failed at the United Nations. Over the ensuing eight decades, humanity only escaped a devastating nuclear exchange through semi-effective international cooperation (e.g., the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, without which there might be several dozen nuclear-armed states today) and luck.[165] The Advanced Technology Development Authority outlined above is modeled intentionally to avoid the failure of the U.S. proposal to establish international control over atomic weapons and energy. Three core elements of this failure—U.S. insistence on the elimination of the United Nations Security Council veto on nuclear matters, Soviet objections over sovereignty, and the format of the negotiations—are rooted in the United Nations framework. The Soviet Union, for example, refused to accept the U.S. initiative on the grounds that the veto is a foundational element of the United Nations Security Council structure. Similarly, the Soviets claimed that the proposed inspections regime amounted to a grave violation of state sovereignty, a pillar of the United Nations charter. The forum of the United Nations, where states must propose, debate, and defend proposals in high-profile, high-stakes

public negotiations, also placed the Soviets, who were already suspicious and distrustful, on the defensive. This constrained the flexibility and compromise necessary to achieve agreement on the international control of nuclear energy.[166]

To mitigate these core causes of the Baruch Plan's failure, the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority would function wholly independently of the United Nations framework. Direct, private negotiations among states possessing nonhuman technology offer the best chance for the successful establishment of such an entity.[167] Moreover, given the ambitious, unprecedented nature of the proposed research and development initiative, preliminary measures to build trust among potential parties to an agreement may be critical to its ultimate establishment. These might include states exchanging inventories of the items and materials of nonhuman origin in their possession, agreeing to refrain from offensive strikes and surveillance utilizing platforms derived from nonhuman technology, or committing to halt weaponization efforts.

The importance of trust in this context cannot be overemphasized.[168] Profound mistrust between the United States and Soviet Union overshadowed the failure to reach agreement on the American plan to establish international control of nuclear energy.[169] Ultimately, each state framed the debate in terms of national, versus civilizational, security. Fear of the Other, in short, came to overshadow fear of the Bomb.[170] While profound shifts in global public opinion or diplomatic pressures following any official acknowledgment of nonhuman technology may supersede deep mistrust among geopolitical competitors like the United States, Russia, and China, such an outcome, if post-World War II history is any guide, is not guaranteed. One remedy to the deep-seated mistrust among states is for a small number of scientists from states possessing nonhuman technology to lead negotiations on the establishment of the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority. As discussed above, leading scientists, including Robert Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr, Vannevar Bush, and James Conant, envisioned and formalized the U.S. plan to establish international control over nuclear energy, often over the initial objections of policymakers.[171] To that end, a diplomatic initiative led by a small, multinational group of scientists has the greatest chance of establishing the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority.

The establishment of a supranational entity to govern nonhuman technology, as envisioned here, would face significant obstacles. If, for example, Senator Rounds' characterization of ostensibly reverse-engineered craft capable of extraordinary speeds, maneuverability, and transmedium travel is accurate, states may have already adapted advanced nonhuman technology for military purposes. Any such scenario, which is difficult to diagnose accurately with limited information, would demand delicate negotiation. It is not difficult to envision, for example, profound disagreements among states over the disclosure, let alone the transfer, of highly advanced *existing* military capabilities derived from nonhuman technology. Any such impasse may be roughly akin to the core U.S.-Soviet disagreement over the sequencing of the core elements of the competing proposals for international control over nuclear energy and may require a series of confidence-building measures to overcome.

As the failed post-war effort to establish global governance of nuclear energy demonstrates, flexibility and compromise will almost certainly be critical to the successful establishment of

an Advanced Technology Development Authority. Rigid negotiating positions and diplomatic posturing are incongruous with the existential threat posed by an unconstrained arms race to weaponize advanced nonhuman technology. Given the unprecedented, ambitious nature of the international research and development initiative proposed here, dogged insistence on a "perfect" solution must not preclude initial steps toward such an outcome.

Undoubtedly the most significant obstacle to the establishment of the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority is the national—versus human civilizational—security mindset prevalent among policymakers. Will, for example, an American president be prepared to entrust U.S. national security to the good intentions of Russian and Chinese leaders (and vice versa) following official acknowledgment of the existence of nonhuman intelligence? The U.S. initiative to bring nuclear energy under international control shows that radical proposals, which might otherwise appear naive, idealistic, or extreme, may be adopted as official policy under the right conditions.[172] History also offers an additional insight. In late 1985, amid soaring Cold War tensions, President Ronald Reagan met his new Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, for the first time. Following a series of tense bilateral meetings, Reagan asked Gorbachev privately whether the Soviets would assist the United States in the event of an extraterrestrial invasion.[173] Gorbachev responded affirmatively and Reagan reciprocated, to shared laughter.[174]

Reagan's lighthearted question broke the ice between the leaders of the world's nuclear-armed superpowers and helped change the course of history.[175] The close, deeply personal connection that Reagan and Gorbachev forged in the ensuing years ushered in a peaceful end to the Cold War.[176] Moreover, in a speech before the United Nations two years after Reagan and Gorbachev's 1985 meeting, Reagan mused openly about "how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish" if humanity confronted a malevolent extraterrestrial intelligence.[177] Given his prominent role in the Cold War—the ultimate national security paradigm—Reagan's readiness to adopt a human civilizational security mindset in this context suggests that others may, too.

The grave existential risks posed by an unconstrained arms race to exploit nonhuman technology demand historically unprecedented nonproliferation efforts. The Advanced Technology Development Authority proposed here is not an experiment in naive, utopian global idealism. It is intended, rather, as robust risk containment amid a potentially unprecedented strategic shock. Ultimately, an international scientific initiative to develop and operate advanced nonhuman technology for peaceful purposes represents the most viable—perhaps the only—path to global stability, responsible innovation, and human advancement.

Conclusion

Key members of the United States Senate and executive branch officials indicate that the United States and its geopolitical competitors are engaged in a surreptitious arms race to exploit advanced technologies of nonhuman origin. The potentially grave risks to global security and stability posed by such a dynamic, should it indeed exist, demand active public debate and discourse. Notably, legislation sponsored by Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer urges executive branch transparency on unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) to avoid *"potential technological surprise in furtherance of urgent national security concerns."*[178] The Schumer-led UAP Disclosure Act also defines the term "nonhuman intelligence" and indicates that a long-running U.S. government "legacy program" retrieved and is attempting to "reverse engineer" advanced technologies of unknown origin.[179] Similarly, UAP-focused legislation proposed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence warns of an "increasing potential for technology surprise from foreign adversaries" and suggests that excessive secrecy has hindered innovation and technical advances derived from retrieved UAP technology.[180]

In interviews, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, formerly the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and Senator Michael Rounds, a member of the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services committees, suggested that nations are engaged in a clandestine race to weaponize retrieved UAP technology, as did the late former Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Similarly, at least five former senior executive branch officials allege the existence of a sub-rosa competition among the United States and its geopolitical rivals to weaponize advanced nonhuman technology.

Any arms race of this nature poses grave risks to global security. A common assumption that formal acknowledgment of the existence of nonhuman intelligence or technology ushers in global cooperation and harmony by default is not guaranteed. Instead, any official disclosure of such technology may intensify hidden military research and development efforts, spurring a uniquely destabilizing and potentially catastrophic global security dynamic. Nuclear and conventional deterrence, the cornerstones of international security, rely on predictable, widely known capabilities. Revolutionary weapons systems derived from advanced UAP technology would almost certainly render existing military and defense frameworks obsolete, upending existing deterrence models. In this context, philosopher Nick Bostrom's "vulnerable world" hypothesis is instructive. Bostrom, in short, theorizes that some future, as-yet unknown scientific discovery will invariably destabilize global security or destroy human civilization. As a remedy, Bostrom proposes the implementation of historically unprecedented international cooperation and surveillance measures.

Any arms race among the world's superpowers to exploit advanced nonhuman technologies is fertile ground for the type of catastrophic discovery or destabilizing development envisioned by Bostrom. In one scenario, the technologies described by Senator Rounds—craft capable of extreme speeds, extraordinary maneuverability, and the ability to operate in the air or underwater—are employed to create an operational national missile defense system, rendering other states' strategic nuclear deterrents obsolete. Alternatively, nonhuman technology may be mar-

ried with existing weapons of mass destruction. Under this scenario, a state may be incentivized to employ such asymmetric technology to rapidly and simultaneously transport hundreds of nuclear warheads to an adversary's core political, defense, and nuclear second-strike infrastructure to conduct an ostensibly "safe first strike" (i.e., a scenario where a state perceives minimal risk of massive nuclear retaliation).

Similarly, extreme secrecy, uncertainty, and strategic paranoia spurred by a geopolitical competition to weaponize advanced UAP technology may lead to catastrophic miscalculations and misunderstandings. If, for example, states are unable to verify how close a rival is to a major engineering or strategic breakthrough, they may conclude that a potentially catastrophic preemptive strike is the only path to survival. In stark contrast to nuclear weapons, the full range of potential applications of advanced nonhuman technology is unknown. To that end, any official disclosure of the existence of retrieved UAP materials demands historically unprecedented nonproliferation efforts.

The failure of a post-World War II initiative to achieve effective global governance of nuclear energy provides valuable insights into a potential post-disclosure security paradigm. Largely forgotten following decades of Cold War-induced fears of civilizational destruction, United States policy in the immediate post-war era explicitly called for the international control of nuclear weapons and technology. Knowing that other states would inevitably develop the atomic bomb and that the U.S. nuclear monopoly would last for only a few years, leading American physicists, most notably Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein, advocated vociferously for multilateral control. Remarkably, in 1946, the United States offered to eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile and transfer control of its sweeping nuclear infrastructure to a supranational authority. Disagreements with the Soviet Union rooted in a national—versus a human civilizational—security framing doomed the American proposal to bring atomic energy under international control. Ultimately, fear of the "the Other" overshadowed fear of "the Bomb." Only a combination of semi-effective international cooperation (e.g., the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, without which there might be several dozen nuclear-armed states today) and luck prevented civilizational catastrophe amid the ensuing nuclear arms race.

The postwar failure to bring nuclear energy under international control, in tandem with Bostrom's remedies for a "vulnerable world," are vital to analyses of a potential post-disclosure global security paradigm. This assessment examines three plausible scenarios for the evolution of global security following official confirmation of nonhuman technology: **(1)** A default catastrophic arms race, **(2)** open scientific exchange, and **(3)** closed scientific exchange. This paper finds that all "catastrophic arms race" scenarios predicated on the weaponization of advanced nonhuman technology pose unacceptable civilizational risks and cannot be won.

The preferred evolution of global security following formal disclosure of the existence of nonhuman intelligence and technology would see a multilateral agreement whereby all nations (or entities) in possession of advanced nonhuman technology commit to transferring such items and materials to a supranational research and development initiative (e.g., an Advanced Technology Development Authority). This initiative, modeled on the science and research-focused Atomic Development Authority envisioned by Oppenheimer, would be tasked with the research, development, and operation of *peaceful* applications and adaptations of such technology.

Given the high probability that research and study of nonhuman craft and technology leads to a scientific discovery which invariably poses an existential risk to humanity, the Advanced Technology Development Authority's findings and discoveries would remain restricted to the scientists and engineers formally affiliated with the Authority. Only *intrinsically safe* advances (e.g., certain medical therapeutics) would be disseminated broadly beyond the Authority. At the same time, given the potential for dangerous and "dual-use" discoveries (i.e., those with both "safe" and "dangerous" applications), the scientists and engineers affiliated with the Authority would be subject to surveillance and movement restrictions. Over time, as confidence and trust among participating nations increases, such "preventive policing" measures may be eased. The Authority would also engage in inspection and verification activities to deter state cheating or noncompliance (e.g., if a state fails to transfer all nonhuman technology to the Authority, conducts unauthorized research or weaponization activity, etc.).

The establishment of a supranational entity to govern nonhuman technology, as envisioned here, would face significant obstacles. Chief among them is the national—versus human civilizational—security mindset prevalent among policymakers. Will, for example, an American president entrust U.S. national security to the good intentions of Russian and Chinese leaders—and vice versa—following official acknowledgment of the existence of nonhuman intelligence? The post-war U.S. initiative to bring nuclear energy under international control shows that radical proposals, which might otherwise appear naive, idealistic, or extreme, may be adopted as official policy under the right conditions.

History offers an additional insight. In late 1985, amid soaring Cold War tensions, President Ronald Reagan asked his new Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, a lighthearted question about UAP and extraterrestrial life. The exchange broke the ice between the leaders of the world's superpowers and helped change the course of history. Moreover, in a speech before the United Nations two years later, Reagan mused openly about "how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish" if humanity confronted a malevolent extraterrestrial intelligence. Given his prominent role in the Cold War, the ultimate national security paradigm, Reagan's readiness to adopt a human civilizational security mindset in this context suggests that others may be prepared to do so, too.

Ultimately, if the Oppenheimer-led plan to bring nuclear energy under international control is adapted to the current proposal for an Advanced Technology Development Authority, it may read:

The program we propose will undoubtedly arouse skepticism when it is first considered… It may seem too idealistic.

It may seem too radical, too advanced, too much beyond human experience. All these terms apply with peculiar fitness to the [knowledge that humanity is not alone in the universe].

In considering the plan, as inevitable doubts arise as to its acceptability,

one should ask oneself, '*What are the alternatives*?' *We have, and we find no tolerable answer*.[181]

The grave existential risks posed by an unconstrained arms race to exploit nonhuman technology demand historically unprecedented nonproliferation efforts. An Advanced Technology Development Authority is proposed here not as an experiment in naive, utopian global idealism. It is intended, rather, as robust risk containment amid a potentially unprecedented geopolitical shock. Ultimately, an international research and development initiative tasked with adapting nonhuman technology to *peaceful* purposes represents the most viable—and perhaps the only—path to global stability, responsible innovation, and human advancement in a postdisclosure world.

About the Author:

Marik von Rennenkampff is a noted public commentator and analyst of UAP affairs. He served as an appointee at the US Department of Defense during the Obama administration and later worked on nonproliferation issues at the US State Department. He delivers the Sol Briefing, the Sol Foundation's monthly update on UAP news, and has been a regular contributor to The Hill, NewsNation, and other media outlets.

Notes

1. Schumer, "Schumer, Rounds Introduce New Legislation to Declassify Government Records Related to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena & UFOs."
2. U.S. Senate, "Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Disclosure Act."
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. von Rennenkampff, "'Technology surprise': Are China, Russia Ahead of Us in UFO Retrieval, Research?"
6. U.S. Senate, "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024."
7. Farah, *The Age of Disclosure*.
8. In addition to several *former* government officials alleging the existence of surreptitious UAP retrieval and reverse-engineering efforts, Rubio stated that "some of [the UAP whistleblowers who spoke to Congress] still work in the government" (Khalil, "Rubio on UFO Whistleblower Claims: 'We're Taking it Seriously.'"). Like Rubio, Rounds indicated that UAP whistleblowers currently serving in government and at private defense contractors have spoken to Congress (Troli, "U.S. Senator Mike Rounds Discusses the Epstein Files, Housing Legislation and Defense Spending."). Rubio, Rounds, and Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand have also described retaliation fears, with Rubio stating, "some [UAP whistleblowers] frankly, are fearful of harm coming to them" and are "fearful of ever commenting because they think it's punishable by death" (Khalil, "Rubio on UFO Whistleblower Claims: 'We're Taking it Seriously.'"). Notably, in a December 2, 2025, interview with Fox News commentator Sean Hannity, Rubio stated that flag and general officers informed him of the existence of UAP programs that presidents—let alone Congress—are not informed of.
9. Khalil, "Rubio on UFO Whistleblower Claims: 'We're Taking it Seriously.'"
10. Farah, *The Age of Disclosure*.
11. Ibid.
12. The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act defines "unidentified anomalous phenomena," in part, to include "transmedium objects or devices," which are "observed to transition between space and the atmosphere, or between the atmosphere and bodies of water."
13. Troli, "U.S. Senator Mike Rounds Discusses the Epstein Files, Housing Legislation and Defense Spending."
14. Troli, "Senator Mike Rounds on his Bid for Reelection, Border Security, Greenland and More."
15. U.S. Senator Mike Rounds Discusses the Epstein Files, Housing Legislation and Defense Spending
16. Kean, "Glowing Auras and 'Black Money': The Pentagon's Mysterious U.F.O. Program."
17. U.S. Department of Defense, "Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program."
18. U.S. Department of Defense, "Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Contract—Update."
19. U.S. Department of Defense, "Info Memo: Advanced Aerospace Threat and Identification Program."
20. U.S. Department of Defense, "Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Application Program."
21. Puthoff, "Special Program Briefing: Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program."
22. Knapp, "Former Sen. Harry Reid Wants UFO studies Made Public."
23. Knapp, "Opening Statement."

24. Knapp, "Scientist Reveals Details of Top-secret UFO Research in Las Vegas."
25. Established at the urging of Congress, the UAP Task Force preceded the U.S. government's current UAP analysis effort, the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office.
26. Farah, *The Age of Disclosure*.
27. Merchant, "Whistleblower Tells Congress the US is Concealing 'Multi-decade' Program that Captures UFOs."
28. Kean, "Intelligence Officials Say U.S. Has Retrieved Craft of Nonhuman Origin."
29. Khalil, "Rubio on UFO Whistleblower Claims: 'We're Taking it Seriously.'"
30. Kean, "Intelligence Officials Say U.S. Has Retrieved Craft of Nonhuman Origin."
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Preliminary Guidance for Implementation of NDA Waiver."
34. Bostrom, "The Vulnerable World Hypothesis."
35. Ibid.
36. Bostrom also proposes an "easy nukes" counterfactual, whereby the development of nuclear weapons is a technically uncomplicated process accessible to any determined individual or group. To prevent civilizational destruction, Bostrom surmises that governments would seek to restrict access to relevant raw materials, classify and prohibit discussion of the underlying science, etc. A similar dynamic—fear that nonhuman UAP technology might be weaponized with minimal effort—may partially explain government reluctance to disclose its existence.
37. von Rennenkampff, "Destabilizing UFO technology and a 'vulnerable world.'"
38. Hastings, UFOs & Nukes.
39. As Oppenheimer noted, major strategic errors can occur "when even the men who know the facts can find no one to talk to about them, when the facts are too secret for discussion, and thus for thought." (Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy.")
40. Leviero, "U.S. Urges World Control of Atomic Energy."
41. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
42. For incidents where human civilization avoided potentially catastrophic nuclear conflicts only through *luck*, see, e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis/Soviet B-59 submarine incident, the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident, Able Archer 83, the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, etc.
43. Avalon Project, "The Quebec Conference: Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy."
44. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
45. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: *The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949*.
46. Bohr, "Open Letter to the United Nations."
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949*.
50. Atomic Heritage Foundation, "Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire."
51. National Security Archive, "Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War."
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.
55. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
56. National Security Archive, "Memorandum from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Office of Scientific Research and Development, to Secretary of War."
57. Ibid.
58. Bush and Conant also believed that broad public knowledge and understanding of the consequences of nuclear weapons use and proliferation would spur public support for international control. See also: "Prospectus on Nucleonics" (1944).
59. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb."
60. Ibid.
61. National Security Archive, "Memorandum discussed with the President."
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb."
68. National Security Archive, "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting."
69. National Security Archive, "Memorandum by J. R. Oppenheimer, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons."
70. Wellerstein, "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting."
71. U.S. Department of State, "Truman-Stalin Conversation."
72. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
73. Describing the moment of the first atomic detonation, Oppenheimer recalled: "We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed. A few people cried. Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad Ghita... 'Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.' I suppose we all thought that one way or another."
74. Beyond urging against use of the atomic bomb against Japanese cities and accurately predicting the Cold War nuclear arms race, the Manhattan Project nuclear scientists at the University of Chicago, including James Franck, Glenn Seaborg, and Leó Szilárd, argued that "effective international control" was the only plausible path to global peace and security. See: "The Franck Report" (1945)
75. Miller Center, "Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima."
76. Miller Center, "Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference."
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Miller Center, "Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima."
80. Ibid.
81. Immediately following World War II, Manhattan Project scientists at the University of Chicago formed the Federation of Atomic Scientists (now the Federation of American Scientists) to advocate for international control of nuclear weapons and technology. The scientists also established the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, known today for the Doomsday Clock.
82. U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman."

83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of War (Stimson) to President Truman."
87. Ibid.
88. Truman Library, "Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy."
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. National Archives, "Memorandum from Admiral William D. Leahy to President Harry S. Truman."
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. *New York Times*, "Einstein Urges World Government for Atomic Control to Avoid War."
98. Roosevelt Library, "Einstein Letter to Roosevelt."
99. Einstein, "Einstein on the Atomic Bomb."
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Welles, "The Atomic Bomb and World Government."
105. *New York Times*, "Three-Nation Declaration on Atomic Energy."
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. U.S. Department of State, "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the Secretary of State."
109. *New York Times*, "Three-Nation Declaration on Atomic Energy."
110. Ibid.
111. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."
115. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
116. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid. Emphasis mine.
122. Ibid.
123. Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy."

124. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."
125. Ibid.
126. Oppenheimer, "The Atom Bomb As a Great Force for Peace."
127. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."
128. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
129. Ibid.
130. Notably, the Oppenheimer-led Acheson-Lilienthal proposal took no position on, and did not mention, the United Nations Security Council veto.
131. Baruch agreed with Truman that the United States ought not "under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure that the rest of the world can't arm against us." (Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War.")
132. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
133. *New York Times*, "Baruch's Speech at Opening Session of U.N. Atomic Energy Commission."
134. Ibid.
135. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
136. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Address by the Soviet Representative (Andrei Gromyko) to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission."
137. Hamilton, "Soviet Flatly Rejects Baruch Control Plan: Gromyko is Sharp."
138. Baratta, "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?"
139. Holloway, "The Soviet Union and the Baruch Plan."
140. See, e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis/Soviet B-59 submarine incident, the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident, Able Archer 83, the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, etc.
141. Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950*.
142. Kearn, "The Baruch Plan and the Quest for Atomic Disarmament."
143. Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949*.
144. Dallin, "America Through Soviet Eyes."
145. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
146. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
147. Hamilton, "Soviet in U.N. Bars Atomic Inspections as Infringement."
148. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War."
149. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946."
150. Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy."
151. Baratta, "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?"
152. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."
153. Einstein, "The Real Problem Is in the Hearts of Men."
154. Zaidi, "International Control of Powerful Technology: Lessons from the Baruch Plan for Nuclear Weapons."
155. History suggests that, while the default "catastrophic arms race" scenario is undesirable, it may be the most likely evolution of global security following official disclosure of advanced nonhuman technology. Should humanity avoid civilizational destruction in such a scenario, it will

likely be due only to a combination of *semi-effective* international agreements and cooperation (See, e.g., the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and related strategic arms control measures) and *luck* (See, e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis/Soviet B-59 submarine incident, the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident, Able Archer 83, the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, etc.).

156. The proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority assuming control of nonhuman technology mirrors a core role of the Oppenheimer-envisioned Atomic Development Authority (i.e., control over the natural deposits and mining of the raw materials required for nuclear fission).
157. Kearn, "The Baruch Plan and the Quest for Atomic Disarmament."
158. Any potential inspection and verification regime may take inspiration from, e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards procedures, the Treaty on Open Skies, New START on-site inspections, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization remote sensing network, etc.
159. Another version of the "open scientific exchange" scenario would see states (or entities) transferring nonhuman technology to the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority on a voluntary basis. While noncompliant states would presumably face political, diplomatic, and public pressure to transfer *all* nonhuman technology to the proposed Advanced Technology Development Authority, the potential for surreptitious state research and weaponization efforts means that any such voluntary model must be considered a sub-scenario of the default "catastrophic arms race."
160. Bostrom refers to such actors as the "apocalyptic residual."
161. Control over "intrinsically dangerous" nuclear activities (e.g., uranium mining, enrichment, energy generation, and explosives testing) was a core element of the Oppenheimer-proposed Atomic Development Authority.
162. Atomic physicists, most notably Oppenheimer and Einstein, believed that key elements of nuclear science should not be disseminated freely before the establishment of an effective system of safeguards.
163. As envisioned, such measures would be roughly akin to the security architecture of the Manhattan Project, where counterintelligence efforts and compartmentalization played key roles in maintaining operations security across a large organization with a singular objective.
164. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."
165. For incidents where human civilization avoided potentially catastrophic nuclear conflicts only through *luck*, see, e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis/Soviet B-59 submarine incident, the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident, Able Archer 83, the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, etc.
166. Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy."
167. Both physicist Niels Bohr and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advocated direct engagement with the Soviets on international control of nuclear energy. See, e.g., Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946."
168. As Oppenheimer noted, "This solution which the United States has proposed and advocated is a radical solution, and clearly calls for a spirit of mutual confidence and trust in order to give it any elements of substance." (Oppenheimer, "International Control of Atomic Energy.")
169. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946."
170. Sears, "Great Power Rivalry and Macrosecuritization Failure: Why States Fail to 'Securitize' Existential Threats to Humanity."

171. Ibid.
172. Zaidi, "International Control of Powerful Technology: Lessons from the Baruch Plan for Nuclear Weapons."
173. Lewis, "Reagan and Gorbachev Agreed to Pause the Cold War in Case of an Alien Invasion."
174. Orr, "Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to fight UFOs."
175. See also: Reagan's Dec. 4, 1985, remarks at Fallston High School, Fallston, Maryland.
176. von Rennenkampff, "Biden Should Channel Reagan, ask Putin About UFOs at Summit."
177. Reagan Library, "Address to the 42d Session of the United Nations General Assembly."
178. U.S. Senate, "Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Disclosure Act."
179. Ibid.
180. U.S. Senate, "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024."
181. International Panel on Fissile Materials, "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy."

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The Sol Foundation
www.thesolfoundation.org
information@thesolfoundation.org

Cofounders: Dr. Garry Nolan, Dr. Peter Skafish

Design: Isaac Lopez, Monarch Digital