Executive Summary

The United States government’s recent acknowledgment of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) has prompted renewed interest in their national security implications. While much attention has focused on the aerospace implications of UAP, the potential health security dimensions remain underexplored. This paper examines assertions in recent UAP legislation, considers hypothetical health threats linked to UAP based on prior reported incidents, discusses the challenges in detecting and managing anomalous health threats in general, and recommends strategies to improve US preparedness for these low-probability, high-consequence scenarios.

This analysis is speculative, drawing on definitions in recently proposed federal UAP legislation and a limited number of reported UAP incidents. It does not claim these definitions or reported incidents are conclusive and acknowledges that if UAP-related health effects are substantiated, they may have prosaic explanations. However, given the potential for significant harm, the report argues that accounting for these tail risks in US biodefense planning is prudent. While preparedness for “unknown unknowns” should not distract from higher-probability health security priorities, the consequences of strategic surprise justify some proactive risk mitigation.

Implementing these recommendations will require sustained high-level leadership and resources but will leave the nation better prepared to assess and respond to all forms of health threats, regardless of origin.

In this paper, we discuss the following key findings:

1. The proposed UAP amendment to the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) specifically referenced “invasive biological effects” and “biological evidence of non-human intelligence” in connection with UAP.
2. Proactive efforts to understand the health security implications of UAP are warranted, given the potential for catastrophic consequences from a genuine health threat.
3. UAP-related biological effects can be viewed as a special case of the broader challenge of “anomalous health threats,” which may range from exposure to radiation or directed energy weapons to unconventional biological agents.
4. Existing US biodefense and health security frameworks have gaps in their ability to detect and respond to truly anomalous health threats.

We also make the following recommendations for the US government:

1. Assign responsibility for all anomalous health threats to the National Security Council (NSC) Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense.
2. Establish an interagency task force to coordinate efforts to assess and respond to all anomalous health threats.
3. Establish a Rapid Response Team (RRT) that can respond to anomalous health incidents.
4. Create a comprehensive database for anomalous health incidents.
5. Strengthen biosurveillance infrastructure for early detection of emerging threats.
6. Harmonize UAP-related plans with existing national health security and biodefense strategies.